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ABSTRACT – This research applies a recently developed model of accident causation, developed to investigate industrial 
accidents, to a specially gathered sample of 997 crashes investigated in-depth in 6 countries. Based on the work of Hollnagel the 
model considers a collision to be a consequence of a breakdown in the interaction between road users, vehicles and the 
organisation of the traffic environment. 54% of road users experienced interpretation errors while 44% made observation errors 
and 37% planning errors. In contrast to other studies only 11% of drivers were distracted and 8% inattentive. There was 
remarkably little variation in these errors between the main road user types. The application of the model to future in-depth crash 
studies offers the opportunity to identify new measures to improve safety and to mitigate the social impact of collisions. 
Examples given include the potential value of co-driver advisory technologies to reduce observation errors and predictive 
technologies to avoid conflicting interactions between road users.  
 
__________________________________
INTRODUCTION 
The search for effective countermeasures to reduce 
the social costs of traffic crashes has prompted many 
crash investigation studies globally which analyse the 
characteristics and circumstances of individual 
crashes in order to identify common factors. An early 
model of accident causation was developed by 
Heinrich (1931) who proposed the so-called domino 
theory in the context of industrial accidents. The 
model explained an accident as a step in a sequential 
chain of events or circumstances, each of which was 
dependent on the previous event. By removing one of 
the events the consequent circumstance would be 
avoided and the accident prevented. The model is 
typical of what are now called simple linear 
sequential models and Heinrich identified five 
categories of factor 
 
 Social environment/ancestry 
 Fault of the person 
 Unsafe acts, mechanical and physical 
hazards 
 Accident 
 Injury 
The identification of human behaviour, framed within 
the concept of blame, is one that continues to 
influence road safety management practises today. 
Heinrich’s model has influenced road safety 
management for over 30 years and crash prevention 
strategies still frequently focus on identifying the 
“root cause” with the intention of eliminating it and 
thereby preventing future crashes. It resonates with 
the concept of a crash mainly being a result of high-
risk factors such as high levels of alcohol and speed, 
inadequate road design or low crashworthiness 
standards.  
Since the 1930’s accident causation models have 
recognised the multi-factorial nature of crash 
causation and modified versions of the simple linear 
model have been developed. Haddon (1968) applied 
epidemiological concepts to propose what is now 
termed the Haddon matrix as a method to capture the 
influence of several components of safety including 
the road user, vehicle and infrastructure. He also 
introduced the sequential nature of crash events by 
identifying separately the pre-crash, crash and post-
crash phases. The model has had widespread 
application to clarifying road safety problems and has 
led to many successful safety interventions. 
Nevertheless the model has limitations as it does not 
explicitly incorporate the concept of exposure, nor 
does it facilitate an assessment of the interactions 
between components. If an aspect of human 
behaviour is identified as a risk factor the tendency is 
to look for a countermeasure that directly addresses 
that behaviour whereas there may be more efficient 
but indirect solutions. It reinforces the concept of 
risky behaviours as violations of the traffic rules.  
More recent models of accident causation developed 
for industrial processes have come to consider the 
development of risks within a closely coupled, 
integrated system of which humans are a part. All 
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components of all systems have a variation in 
performance whether they are human, mechanical or 
algorithmic. Systems that are increasingly tightly 
coupled are less resilient to the effects of adverse 
circumstances. Humans in the control loop have the 
opportunity to adapt behaviour to enable the system 
accommodate to adverse conditions but in a tightly 
coupled system a minor human error can result in a 
major outcome.  
In considering the behaviour of systems Reason 
(2000) identified two types of error that may occur. 
Active failures are unsafe acts that are committed by 
people who are components in the system. He states 
that they may take a variety of forms including slips, 
lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and procedural violations. 
In traditional safety models they are often attributed 
as the root cause and associated with blame. 
Secondly he identifies latent conditions, which 
represent attributes of the system – design, 
functionality, operation. Normally these deficiencies 
have no consequence and there are no adverse 
outcomes. However when the trigger of an active 
failure aligns with the latent conditions of the system 
it may result in an adverse outcome. Reason (2000) 
illustrates this with the so-called Swiss cheese model 
(Fig 1)  
 
Fig 1: Swiss cheese model of accident causation 
(Reason 2000). 
Reason provides the analogy that the slices of the 
cheese represent defensive layers based on 
engineering or behaviour constraints while the holes 
represent the active and latent failures in the system. 
Normally the holes are moving around, opening and 
closing and there are a number of defensive layers in 
operation that prevent adverse events. A hazardous 
scenario is only able to result in damage when the 
holes are aligned and each defensive layer is 
breached. One challenge when applying systems-
based approaches to road safety concerns the 
availability of a tool to generalise results and to 
consider population effects. Industrial accidents are 
typically viewed individually however traffic crashes 
occur in large numbers and there is a need to 
generalise for the purposes of road safety 
policymaking. In parallel with the work of Reason, 
Hollnagel (1998) has developed the Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
where an accident is defined as an unsuccessful 
interaction between the person, technology and 
organisation. In it he identifies a critical event that is 
the single immediate precursor to the accident and 
which is defined to describe an action of a person. 
The method then requires the analyst to attribute a 
single general causation factor that Hollnagel terms 
Phenotypes. There are nine classes of these factors 
that together are taken to describe all types of 
physical interaction and which characterise an action, 
these are 
 Timing,  
 Duration,  
 Sequence,  
 Object,  
 Force,  
 Direction, 
 Speed,  
 Distance 
 Volume. 
Each of these general factors is sub-divided and 
related to specific causation factors Hollnagel termed 
Genotypes which precede the general factors both 
chronologically and within a causation chain. In turn 
these may also be related to further antecedents with 
a set of predefined relationships specified by the 
method. CREAM is a general approach and is 
intended to be applicable across domains. Ljung 
(2002) has developed CREAM for application to the 
road safety domain with the derivative titled Driver 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (DREAM). 
Between 2004 and 2008 the European Commission 
supported the SafetyNet project (Thomas et al, 2008) 
with the objective of establishing the European Road 
Safety Observatory (ERSO). This included the 
development of a new approach to investigate crash 
causation for policymaking purposes and for this 
activity Ljung adapted the genotypes and coding 
rules of DREAM to be appropriate for traffic safety 
analysis. The resulting analysis method was termed 
SafetyNet Accident Causation System (SNACS). 
Ljung et al developed a coding manual to specify the 
phenotypes and genotypes available together with the 
coding rules. To assess the method it was applied to 
the active road users involved in 997 specially 
conducted crash investigations in seven countries 
following which it was modified by Wallén Warner 
et al (2008) and titled DREAM 3.0. The SNACS has 
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been applied in several studies such as those by 
Habibovic et al (2011, 2012). 
This paper describes the SafetyNet Accident 
Causation System and presents an analysis of the 
main causation factors identified by applying the 
system to 998 in-depth crash investigations. To avoid 
confusion in this paper Hollnagels’ Phenotypes are 
termed General Causation Factors while the 
Genotypes are called Specific Causation Factors. 
METHODS 
In-depth crash investigations were made in six 
countries for the purpose of developing and 
validating SNACS. Most teams used on-scene 
methods to gather the data and the distribution 
between countries is shown in Table 1. 
It should be noted that the distribution of cases 
numbers between countries and the selection of the 
countries involved means that the data is not strictly 
representative of the 27 Member States of the 
European Union. 
 
In the cases studied there was information on 1151 
cars, 178 motorcycles and 169 large vehicles. There 
were also 90 pedestrians and 93 cyclists involved in 
these crashes.  
Normal in-depth crash investigation practices were 
utilised and the combination of witness interviews, 
physical evidence and collision reconstructions were 
used to identify and classify the critical event and the 
preceding general and specific causation factors to 
the active drivers, riders and pedestrians. This 
information was combined with the characteristics of 
the vehicle, road environment and road users and 
made available for analysis. The categories and sub-
categories of the general and specific causation 
factors used in the analysis are illustrated in 
Appendix 1, a full description of each category can 
be found in Paulsson (2005). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the distribution of general causation 
factors for the road user in the 997 collisions 
according to the vehicle type. Timing errors were the 
most common amongst each road user group and 
were recorded for 51% of car drivers, 42% of 
motorcyclists, 68% of pedestrians and 46% of 
cyclists. Drivers and motorcyclists most commonly 
did not act when they should have done, on the other 
hand both pedestrians and cyclists responded too 
quickly. Speed errors were also prominent for 
motorcyclists, 24% were considered to be travelling 
too fast while only 2% were too slow. Cyclists also 
committed direction errors (18%) meaning that they 
decided to take an unorthodox route, and also 
distance errors (14%).  
The categories of specific causation factors, which 
were not mutually exclusive, are shown in Table 3.  
Interpretation and planning errors were common 
amongst each type of active road user. These relate to 
errors concerning the identification of other road 
users or features of the traffic environment, errors in 
Table 1. Crashes – investigating countries 
Country Case total 
Germany 98 10% 
Finland 196 20% 
Italy 259 26% 
The Netherlands 126 13% 
Sweden 68 7 % 
United Kingdom 250 25% 
Total 997 100% 
 
Table 2: General causation factors 
 Car drivers Motorcyclists Pedestrians Bicyclists Total 
Timing 584 51% 75 42% 61 68% 43 46% 763 50% 
Duration 24 2% 7 4% 5 6% 8 9% 44 3% 
Force/Power 63 5% 13 7% 0 0% 2 2% 78 5% 
Distance 115 10% 19 11% 11 12% 15 16% 160 11% 
Speed 167 15% 45 25% 6 7% 3 3% 221 15% 
Direction 156 14% 18 10% 0 0% 18 19% 192 13% 
Object 3 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 0% 
Sequence 39 3% 1 1% 7 8% 4 4% 51 3% 
Total 1151 100% 178 100% 90 100% 93 100% 1512 100% 
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analysing the current and predicted behaviour of 
other road users and errors in planning a suitable set 
of actions that would avoid a collision. Temporary 
personal factors were also identified as a relatively 
common specific causation factor, particularly 
amongst pedestrians and car/MPV drivers. 
Communication errors were also observed, 
particularly amongst car/MPV drivers while factors 
associated with the traffic environment were also 
common. Together these five groups of factors 
accounted for 81% of the total factors identified. The 
following tables show a further sub-categorisation of 
the three largest groups of causation factors.  
Interpretation errors typically include quick and 
automated (routine) procedures where typical 
situations and their associated actions are recognized 
and acted upon. Table 4 shows the specific causation 
factors for the interpretation errors, which were 
observed to have been made by 397 of the active road 
users. 42% of the interpretation errors involved a 
faulty diagnosis due to an error in the mental model. 
These occurred where the mental model of the road 
users led them to expect other road users to take one 
action when in fact something different took place. 
A further 20% of the interpretation errors related to a 
misjudgement of time or distance.  
 
Table 5 shows the errors in planning made by the 
road users. These errors are made once the road user 
has observed the traffic situation, identified the key 
characteristics relevant for decision making and is 
preparing to act on the basis of the information 
available. There can be deficiencies in the plan due to 
an incorrect mental model, unexpected side effects or 
prioritisation errors.  
 
The nature of the planning errors is shown in Table 5. 
Planning errors were generally preceded by either 
unintended side effects (47%) or errors in the mental 
model (39%). Unintended side effects occurred 
where the road user does not realise their action will 
have an adverse impact on others. For example a 
driver might brake hard in reaction to a red light 
which results in an collision with a following vehicle. 
Table 3: Specific causation factors 
Specific Causation  
Factor 
Car drivers Motorcyclists Pedestrians Bicyclists Total 
Observation 114 6% 18 6% 4 3% 11 7% 147 6% 
Interpretation 293 16% 39 14% 30 21% 35 24% 397 16% 
Planning 232 13% 58 20% 22 16% 39 27% 351 15% 
Temporary person 
related function 
460 25% 52 18% 39 28% 19 13% 570 24% 
Permanent person 
related functions 
39 2% 1 0% 4 3% 1 1% 45 2% 
Temporary HMI 7 0%  0%  0%  0% 7 0% 
Permanent  HMI 
problem 
14 1%  0% 1 1%  0% 15 1% 
Equipment 33 2% 4 1%  0% 1 1% 38 2% 
Communication 283 15% 35 12% 17 12% 15 10% 350 14% 
Maintenance 76 4% 10 4%  0% 3 2% 89 4% 
Experience and 
training 
67 4% 24 8% 6 4% 5 3% 102 4% 
Organisation 10 1% 7 2% 1 1% 1 1% 19 1% 
Design of traffic 
environment 
216 12% 35 12% 16 11% 17 12% 284 12% 
Vehicle design 3 0% 2 1%  0%  0% 5 0% 
Total 1847 100% 285 100% 140 100% 147 100% 2419 100% 
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The crash investigators classified 570 of the road 
users as experiencing temporary personal factors that 
led to the crash occurring, these represented 24% of 
the 2419 factors coded. The nature of these factors is 
shown in Table 6. Of the total 570 temporary 
personal factors recorded 182 (30%) concerned 
distraction and another 123 (22%) concerned 
inattention. The influence of substances such as 
alcohol or drugs was recorded in 94 (17%) of the 
factors.Further details of the temporary personal 
factors are shown in Table 7. Of the distraction 
related factors the most common was associated with 
a competing external activity, in other words an event 
or object outside the vehicle that captured the 
attention of the driver. Distraction due to competing 
internal activities, such as operating a radio or 
navigation device, were also common representing 56 
of the 182 distraction codes recorded.  
 There were 123 road users identified as being 
inattentive and common causes included boredom 
(27 cases) and a temporary inability (25 cases) such 
as sneezing or coughing. 53 cases were recorded as 
being due to other causes of inattention. 
Of the 101 cases where road users were identified as 
being under the influence of substances there were 78 
that involved alcohol and the cases included all types 
of road user. Prescription and non-prescription drugs 
accounted for 21 of the remaining cases.  
DISCUSSION 
This research has applied a recently developed 
method of causation classification to a specially 
investigated set of crash investigations in order to 
improve understanding of the reasons behind errors 
made by road users. The DREAM method has a 
strong underlying philosophy that crashes are a result 
of a breakdown in the interaction of human, 
technology or organisational aspects of the traffic 
environment. This philosophy provides a framework 
that is first used by the investigators to deconstruct 
the events preceding each crash and identify the 
range of related factors. Secondly the method 
includes a series of coding protocols that enable 
aggregate analysis of a larger quantity of collision 
Table 5 Planning errors 
Planning errors Car drivers Motorcyclists Pedestrians Bicyclists Total 
Inadequate Plan - Error in 
Mental Model 
91 39% 24 41% 8 36% 15 38% 138 39% 
Inadequate Plan - 
Overlooked Side Effects 
112 48% 29 50% 9 41% 15 38% 165 47% 
Inadequate Plan - Other 28 12% 5 9% 5 23% 9 23% 47 13% 
Priority Error - Legitimate 
Higher Priority 
1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 
Total 232 100% 58 100% 22 100% 39 100% 351 100% 
 
Table 4: Interpretation errors 
Interpretation error Car drivers Motorcyclists Pedestrians Bicyclists Total 
Faulty Diagnosis - Error in 
Mental Model 
128 44% 13 33% 11 37% 15 43% 167 42% 
Faulty Diagnosis - New 
Situation 
30 10% 3 8% 0 0% 0 0% 33 8% 
Faulty Diagnosis - Incorrect 
Analogy/Comparison 
35 12% 6 15% 4 13% 7 20% 52 13% 
Faulty Diagnosis - 
Misjudgement of 
Time/Distance 
54 18% 10 26% 9 30% 7 20% 80 20% 
Faulty Diagnosis - Other 30 10% 1 3% 0 0% 3 9% 34 9% 
Wrong Reasoning - 
Incorrect 
analogy/comparison 
2 1% 1 3% 3 10% 0 0% 6 2% 
Wrong Reasoning - Error in 
Mental Model 
5 2% 3 8% 0 0% 2 6% 10 3% 
Decision Error - Shock 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 
Decision Error - Other 8 3% 2 5% 3 10% 1 3% 14 4% 
Total 293 100% 39 100% 30 100% 35 100% 397 100% 
 
6 
 
data in order to identify patterns and trends. 
Table 6: Types of temporary personal factor 
Temporary 
personal factor 
Total % 
Fear 20 4% 
Distraction 182 30% 
Fatigue 67 12% 
Inattention 123 22% 
Under influence 101 17% 
Stress 76 15% 
Other 1 0% 
Total factors 570 100% 
 
The data comprised 997 crashes occurring in six 
countries that were investigated in-depth including 
witness interviews taken either at the scene or 
slightly later. The data cannot be considered strictly 
representative of the EU due to the limited numbers 
of countries covered. The aggregate analysis showed 
that common causation factors are related to 
observation and interpretation of the road scene, 
planning a course of action and temporary personal 
factors. Other types of causation factors were 
recorded but less commonly observed, these included  
 Equipment Failure 
 Communication 
 Maintenance 
 Experience / Knowledge 
 Organisation 
 Road Design 
 Vehicle Design 
 
A total of 2419 factors were recorded in connection 
with the 1151 road users of all types studied and 
1612 (67%) related to the road users themselves 
either in terms of errors they made or in terms of 
individual factors that related to the road user. This 
corresponds with many previous research studies that 
relate crash causation to the road users however the 
SNACS method is able to go further in many cases 
and identify reasons for these factors. In doing so 
there is no consideration of blame or culpability, 
instead it records an impartial analysis for the 
purposes of road safety improvement.  
 
Where further detail of a road user error are lacking 
this may be due to two factors. Firstly it may not 
have been possible for the investigators to fully 
identify the reasons for an error. For example there 
was a lack of evidence in the road users’ statements 
and crash reconstruction to explain most of the 
missed observations, this may have been the road 
users themselves did not know or that there was no 
supporting observable evidence. Secondly the 
SNACS method itself does have limitations where 
the classifications defined do not cover some of the 
most commonly observed real-world situations. In 
these cases it is anticipated the recent modifications 
to the method may be helpful. 
Despite the apparent precision of SNACS the 
conclusions of the analysis remain dependent on the 
conclusions of the investigator which are based on 
both observable and non-reproducible aspects of the 
investigation. This is in common with other causation 
classification methods and lies at the heart of 
attempts to identify key factors. The act of crash 
analysis requires the investigator to form conclusions 
that are inevitably in some part dependent on their 
subjective considerations. Nevertheless the 
availability of a highly structured approach to 
recording and interpreting the evidence reduces the 
subjective element. Comparisons of the individual 
case analyses undertaken within the SafetyNet 
project have identified a high level of inter-coder 
reproducibility (Warner et al 2009). 
Like other approaches to understand road safety 
progress the analytic process explained in this paper 
is limited by a lack of information about the quantity 
of time in traffic or distance travelled as a measure of 
exposure. Crash data can be used to identify common 
characteristics of the collision and to prioritise 
problem areas to be addressed. The data will identify 
common events but without correspondingly detailed 
exposure data it cannot be used to estimate the risks 
associated with any characteristic. The collection of 
suitable exposure data is a major challenge to road 
safety and brings many challenges. The increasing 
interest in naturalistic driving studies does have the 
potential to supply such information however the 
challenges of data capture and particularly analysis 
are large. 
Some traffic crashes may have a simple causation 
sequence, this is particularly common when high risk 
behaviours such as speed, alcohol or fatigue are 
adopted. There may be less additional insight 
provided by the SNACS method in these cases 
compared with standard methods however it still 
serves to provide an approach that avoids allocation 
of culpability and does enable a closer inspection of 
supporting factors. 
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Table 7 Temporary personal factors 
Temporary personal 
factor Car drivers Motorcyclists Pedestrians Bicyclists Total 
Memory Failure - 
Other 
1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 
Fear - Previous 
mistakes 
1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2 0% 
Fear - Insecurity 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 5% 2 0% 
Fear - Conceivable 
Consequences 
11 2% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 12 2% 
Fear - Other 2 0% 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 4 1% 
Distraction - 
Passengers 
36 8% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 36 6% 
Distraction - External 
Competing Activity 
57 12% 5 10% 11 28% 5 26% 78 14% 
Distraction - Internal 
Competing Activity 
49 11% 0 0% 6 15% 1 5% 56 10% 
Distraction - Other 7 2% 2 4% 2 5% 1 5% 12 2% 
Fatigue - Circadian 
rhythm 
28 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 28 5% 
Fatigue - Extensive 
Driving Spell 
4 1% 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 6 1% 
Fatigue - Other 30 7% 2 4% 0 0% 1 5% 33 6% 
Inattention - Temporary 
Inability 
21 5% 4 8% 0 0% 0 0% 25 4% 
Inattention - 
Bored/Unmotivated 
23 5% 3 6% 1 3% 0 0% 27 5% 
Inattention - 
Habit/Expectation 
11 2% 3 6% 0 0% 2 11% 16 3% 
Inattention - Other 45 10% 6 12% 2 5% 2 11% 55 10% 
Under Influence - 
Alcohol 
59 13% 8 15% 8 21% 3 16% 78 14% 
Under Influence - 
Drugs 
9 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9 2% 
Under Influence - 
Medication 
10 2% 1 2% 1 3% 0 0% 12 2% 
Under Influence - 
Other 
2 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 0% 
Physiological Stress - 
Illness 
10 2% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 11 2% 
Physiological Stress - 
Other 
1 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 2 0% 
Psychological Stress - 
Other 
43 9% 10 19% 7 18% 3 16% 63 11% 
Total 460 100% 52 100% 39 100% 19 100% 570 100% 
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The purpose of a crash classification protocol is to 
provide greater detail and precision about the nature 
of the factors surrounding a crash and thereby to 
promote potential countermeasures. New 
technologies are rapidly entering the vehicle and 
infrastructure environment and many of these are 
either intended to address errors made by road users 
or are dependent on the behaviour of the vehicle 
users. By identifying the road user errors that are 
being made and understanding the constraints of road 
user decision making and actions future technologies 
can integrate more effectively with the normal 
demands and behaviours of road users. For example 
the common occurrence of missed observations, 
where a roadside object, junction or road user was 
not detected by the driver due to glare, noise or other 
factors indicates a potential value from the 
development of co-driver support technologies which 
might have the potential to avoid these missed 
objects. Recently developed technologies such as 
Autonomous Braking Systems with pedestrian 
detection are already capable of supporting drivers in 
missed observations of pedestrians and there 
potential impacts. Another example of a missed 
observation concerns the collision scenario where a 
car emerges from a junction into the path of an 
unobserved motorcyclist, this represents an 
observation error for the car driver and an 
interpretation error for the motorcyclist. An effective 
technology-based countermeasure would have to 
have a different functionality for each road user – for 
the car driver it would identify the motorcyclist’s 
presence whereas for the motorcyclist it would 
predict the imminent movement of the car. 
An analysis of system errors such as that described in 
this paper, although providing a new insight of 
causation, will not of itself be sufficient to fully 
describe a collision. Additional information about the 
characteristics of the road, vehicle and infrastructure, 
reconstruction information and information about 
injuries remain essential to a full appraisal of the 
crash. Nevertheless the information provided by an 
analysis such as SNACS adds a very new dimension 
to the understanding of crashes that has not been 
provided by other approaches. 
Road safety management is the function of policy-
making and implantation intended to reduce 
casualties and improve safety on the roads. 
Historically the major measures have been concerned 
with reducing the prevalence of high-risk features 
such as poor vehicles, poor roads and poor road 
users. As the influence of these factors reduces in 
many countries with a well-developed road safety 
infrastructure the attention is increasingly turning to a 
focus on system design and operation in a recognition 
that crashes may involve well-behaving road users in 
safe vehicles on well-designed roads. Increasing 
proportions of crashes are occurring in the absence of 
high risk crash characteristics but with evidence of 
the type of system dysfunction identified in this 
analysis. The investigatory approach outlined in this 
analysis and its future development has great 
potential to reveal new underlying information and 
trends over the causation of crashes. In agreeing on a 
new Decade of Action for road safety the United 
Nations identified the Safe System Approach as a 
broad ranging paradigm for road safety. It is based on 
a shared approach and encapsulates the need to 
address all aspects of the crash. It incorporates the 
concept that crashes are a result of operational 
deficiencies in the road transport system and 
corresponds to the analytic concepts of the Dream 
analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis has applied a new approach to crash 
analysis to a sample of crashes specifically 
investigated. It has revealed that 72% of crashes 
involve factors related to road user factors and 
observation, interpretation and planning errors are 
relatively common. There is remarkably little 
variation in these errors between the main road user 
types. The analytic approach to identifying and 
understanding road user errors provides particular 
opportunities for future road safety policy-making. 
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APPENDIX 1 – ILLUSTRATION OF SPECIFIC CAUSATION FACTORS 
 
Taken from Paulson R (2005) 
